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GRAND JURY: BULWARK OF
PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY?
On December 4, 1969, Chicago police officers went to an apartment
on West Monroe Street to execute a search warrant for illegal weapons.
The incident that followed, now known as the Black Panther raid, re-
sulted in the death of two members of the Black Panther Party and in-
juries to several other persons. A Federal grand jury investigated the
incident and published a written report that raised questions concern-
ing possible violations of Illinois criminal law by members of the
Chicago Police Department, the Illinois State's Attorney's Office, and
the Black Panther Party. Pursuant to this report, the Presiding Judge
of the Circuit Court of Cook County ordered that a venire be issued
for a special grand jury to conduct further investigations. The Cook
County State's Attorney was not allowed to prosecute the action be-
cause his official conduct was subject to investigation by the grand
jury. In his place the court appointed as Special State's Attorney Bar-
nabus F. Sears, a member of the Illinois Bar. Sears was given all the
powers and authority accorded by law to a State's Attorney. The court
impaneled and instructed the Special Grand Jury in December, 1970,
and approximately six months later the Grand Jury returned an indict-
ment charging the State's Attorney of Cook County, an Assistant State's
Attorney and twelve police officers with conspiracy to obstruct justice.'
The proceedings of the Special Grand Jury and the supervision of
that jury by the presiding judge were contested on various grounds by
both parties. All questions were ruled on by the Illinois Supreme
Court in three separate actions.2 Most of the questions, in one way or
another, concerned the limits of authority of supervising judges and
prosecutors in dealing with grand juries in Illinois. However, the spe-
cific issue of interest to this article is the primary question raised in the
ruling of the Illinois Supreme Court in People ex rel Sears v. Romiti
(hereinafter referred to as Sears v. Romit. 3 The conflict arose when
1. People v. Sears, 49 111. 2d 14, 273 N.E.2d 380 (1971).
2. Id. People ex ret Sears v. Romiti, 50 Ill. 2d 51, 277 N.E.2d 105 (1971).
The court consolidated two original actions for consideration and opinion in People v.
Sears.
3. People ex rel Sears v. Romiti, 50 hi. 2d 51, 277 N.E.2d 705 (1971).
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the presiding judge of the Criminal Division of the Criminal Court of
Cook County gave the defendants oral permission to question mem-
bers of the Grand Jury about that body's proceedings, excepting the
jurors' votes and deliberations. The defendants obtained affidavits
from three grand jurors which they submitted to the presiding judge in
support of their charge that the prosecutor exerted undue influence over
the grand jury by debasing witnesses off the record but in front of
the grand jury, opinionizing on the weight of the evidence, and urging
the return of an indictment. 4  Based on these allegations and the sup-
porting affidavits, the defendants asked the court to quash the indict-
ment. The presiding judge considered the affidavits and ordered a
hearing to determine the truth of the allegations. The special prose-
cutor then asked the Illinois Supreme Court for writs of mandamus
and prohibition to bar the hearing, and that court took the action up
for review.5
The supreme court said the question was:
Whether a trial court may conduct a hearing to receive the testi-
mony of grand jurors concerning charges that relate to the de-
meanor of a prosecutor while examining witnesses before the
Grand Jury and to the quality of his argument or advice to them.6
The court held that Illinois courts may not receive the affidavits of
grand jurors for the purpose of impeaching their indictment, and
granted writs barring the hearing. 7
Three dissenting judges said that if the defendants' affidavits charg-
ing such serious misconduct did not warrant a hearing, then they could
not perceive what circumstances would warrant a hearing. Therefore,
they concluded that the decision " . . . renders immune to judicial
scrutiny the conduct of a State's Attorney before a grand jury no matter
how violative of due process or fundamental fairness."" The majority
decision upholds a policy that has long been inherent in the grand jury
system, namely, that grand jury proceedings must remain secret.
4. Id. The dissenting opinion stated the charge:[T]he Special State's Attorney frequently went off the record and made
derogatory comments with respect to the veracity of some of the witnesses,
that one of his assistants referred to a witness as a whore, a slut and a liar,
that the Special State's Attorney expressed the opinion that the evidence of
guilt was 'overwhelming', that he 'scolded' the grand jury for voting no bills
on the preceding day, that when one of the grand jurors stated that an in-
dictment was a very serious thing, the Special State's Attorney said, 'Don't
worry, an indictment is nothing but a piece of paper.'
5. People ex rel Sears v. Romiti, 50 111. 2d 51, 277 N.E.2d 705 (1971).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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Today, much discredit is being heaped upon the grand jury system
for its adherence to secrecy of proceedings. 9 Discontent with the rules
of grand jury secrecy has contributed to assertions that the system is
inefficient, regressive, and of little use in modem criminal proceed-
ings. 10 Many states have abolished the grand jury entirely; others
maintain the system but have relaxed the requirement of secrecy in
many ways. Illinois has continued to uphold the grand jury system
and a concomitant rule of secrecy that grand jurors will not be heard
to impeach their indictment. To understand why the Illinois grand
jury is shrouded in secrecy, and why the secrecy requirement's viability
is in doubt, it is necessary to look at the historical development of the
system.
ORIGINS OF THE GRAND JURY
Modem secrecy policies of the grand jury have, at least in part,
evolved from English history. In 1166 Henry II of England issued the
Grand Assize, a progenitor of our grand jury." The Grand Assize
was composed of laymen from each county whose job it was to ferret
out crimes in the locale and inform the Crown. There were no pre-
tentions of guarding individual rights; the Grand Assize was created
simply ". . . to give a strongly centralized government the advantage
that would be derived from communal accusation of crime."' 2  Ac-
cusation by the Grand Assize raised a presumption of guilt which
forced the accused to undergo the trial methods of compurgation, or
ordeal, to prove his innocence; even if acquitted he was often stigma-
tized by the charges." Thus, without independence from the Crown,
the grand jury served as a potent instrument of governmental oppres-
sion.
Grand juries achieved only a small measure of independence from
the Crown's domination14 until 1681, when in the trial of the Earl of
9. Perhaps the greatest amount of criticism has focused on disclosure of wit-
nesses' testimony before the grand jury to the criminal defendant. Calkins, Grand
Jury Secrecy, 63 MICH. L. REV. 455 (1965); Calkins, The Fading Myth of Grand Jury
Secrecy, 1 JOHN MARSHALL J. 18 (1967); Antell, Modern Grand Jury: Benighted
Supergovernment, 51 A.B.A.J. 153 (1965); Sherry, Grand Jury Minutes: The Un-
reasonable Rule of Secrecy, 48 VA. L. REV. 668 (1962).
10. Note, Should the Grand Jury Indictment Procedure Be Abolished in Illinois?
2 JOHN MARSHALL J. 348 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Grand Jury Indictment Pro-
cedure].
11. 1 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 321-323 (7th ed. 1956).
12. Comment, The Grand Jury, 30 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 149, 151 (1962).
13. Grand Jury Indictment Procedure at 349.
14. See, 1 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (7th ed. 1956).
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Shaftesbury an insurrection occurred that established secrecy as the
means to prevent the Crown's intrusion into grand jury autonomy. 5 In
this case, the Crown charged the Earl with treason and insisted that the
grand jury hear evidence in open court; After the hearing, jurors de-
manded and received the right to question witnesses in private. Not-
withstanding that concession, the Crown still expected full acquiescence
to its charge. But the indictment ultimately returned by the jury had
the word "ignoramus" (we know nothing of it) written across it. In
addition, the jurors would give only their consciences as a reason for
refusing to indict. 16 This was a bold act, for only three months prior
another grand jury had attempted the "ignoramus" tactic, and for this
act of insolence the Crown sent the jury foreman to the Tower of Lon-
don. 17
Ultimately, the Earl of Shaftesbury grand jury prevailed, and the cus-
tom developed of grand jurors receiving testimony in private, without
the presence of the prosecutor or the defendant.18  As time passed,
however, the autocracy of the Crown and the fear of governmental
coercion diminished in England and the prosecutor was permitted to
attend the grand jury and assist in taking testimony. 19
The grand jury in England thus emerged as an investigative and ac-
cusative body with two distinguishing characteristics: it was composed
entirely of laymen and it acted in secrecy. As a result of these two at-
tributes the grand jury helped safeguard the rights of individuals by
standing between the prosecutor and the accused, thus protecting the
citizen from unfounded accusation of crime. This was the historic
purpose of the grand jury in England, and the reason for its secrecy. 0
THE GRAND JURY IN THE UNITED STATES
When this country adopted the grand jury system, it was esteemed as
a bulwark against ungrounded state prosecution of citizens. The fifth
amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees indictment by
grand jury in cases of capital or other infamous crimes. 2' A 1962
15. 8 How. ST. TR. 759, 771-74 (1681).
16. Calkins, The Fading Myth of Grand Jury Secrecy, 1 JOHN MARSHALL J. 18
(1967).
17. Kuh, The Grand fury "Presentment": Foul Blow or Fair Play? 55 COLUM. L.
REV. 1103, 1107 (1955).
18. Calkins, The Fading Myth of Grand Jury Secrecy, I JoHN MARSHALL J. 18
(1967).
19. Id.
20. England abolished the Grand Jury in 1933. Calkins, The Fading Myth of
Grand Jury Secrecy, 1 JOHN MARSHALL J. 18, 25 (1967).
21. The fifth amendment reads: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital,
or other infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.
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Supreme Court opinion emphasizes the traditional importance of the
position held by the grand jury as an instrument of justice:
Historically, this body has been regarded as a primary security to
the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution;
it serves the invaluable function in our society of standing between
the accuser and the accused, . . to determine whether a charge
is dictated by an intimidating power or by malice and personal ill
will.22
The states evidently shared the federal government's high regard for the
Grand Jury. Although the fifth amendment requirement is not bind-
ing upon the states, 23 nearly all state constitutions provided for indict-
ment by grand jury in the early nineteenth century.24
The fifth amendment is silent concerning the procedure of the grand
jury. This meant that federal grand juries were intended to operate in
accordance with procedures established in English common law.25 In
addition, when the thirteen colonies federated in 1787 they adopted
the English common law, and by virtue of this adoption, the English
grand jury system was in force in the states. 26  The grand jury system
was, therefore, recognized as a secret proceeding in both federal and
state jurisprudence. However, American courts set forth five reasons
for secrecy that "bear little similarity" to the traditional purpose of as-
suring the protection of the citizen from oppressive prosecution.2 7
These reasons are: (1) To prevent the escape of those whose indict-
ment may be contemplated; (2) to insure the utmost freedom to the
grand jury in its deliberations, and to prevent persons subject to indict-
ment or their friends from importuning the grand jurors; (3) to pre-
." This permits the government to proceed by "presentment" of the grand jury as
well as by "indictment" proceeding. In a presentment proceeding, the grand jury itself
initiates the investigation, whereas in an indictment proceeding the prosecutor initiates
the investigation. The presentment method has fallen into disuse. See, Note, In-
dictment Sufficiency, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 876 (1970).
22. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962).
23. The Supreme Court stated: "It may be questioned whether the proceeding by
indictment secures to the accused any superior rights and privileges; but certainly a
prosecution by information takes from him no immunity or protection to which he is
entitled under the law." Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 520 (1884). The
Court also held that the states are not under a constitutional duty to grant the de-
fendant a right to a preliminary examination wherein the prosecution justifies its in-
formation by establishing probable cause to a magistrate. Lem Woon v. Oregon,
229 U.S. 586 (1913).
24. Scigliano, Institution of Criminal Prosecutions, 38 ORE. L. REv. 303, 305
(1958).
25. Note, The Grand Jury, 30 U. KAN. CmTY L. REv. 147, 154 (1962).
26. One of the earliest legislative acts in Illinois was the adoption of the English
Common Law. Act of Feb. 4, 1819, Laws of 1819, at 3. See, Note, Survey of the
Grand Jury System, 3 PORTIA L.J. 70 (1967).
27. Calkins, The Fading Myth of Grand Jury Secrecy, 1 JOHN MARSHALL J. 18,
19-20 (1967).
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vent subornation of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may
testify before the grand jury and later appear at the trial of those in-
dicted by it; (4) to encourage free and untrammeled disclosures by
persons who have information with respect to the commission of
crimes; (5) to protect the innocent accused who is exonerated from
disclosure of the fact that he has been under investigation, and from
the expense of standing trial where there was no probability of guilt.
28
It is normally accepted that strict secrecy (regarding the jurors' votes
and deliberations, and the exoneration of innocent suspects) is justi-
fied and commendable while the jury is in session, and after its dismis-
sal.2' The question at hand is the justification for keeping secret the
conduct of the prosecutor before the grand jury when, after dismissal
of the grand jury, a question is raised concerning the propriety of his
conduct.30 Only one of the five stated reasons for secrecy supports a
policy of not allowing jurors to testify concerning misconduct of the
prosecutor, that being "to insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury
in its deliberations, and to prevent persons subject to indictment or
their friends from importuning the grand jurors."'3 1 There is fear that
grand jurors will not feel completely free to act if their actions are
subject to review. Also, there is compelling fear that defendants, in
order to evade trial or delay further proceedings, may cajole or intimi-
date grand jurors in an effort to make them impeach their indictments.
These fears are pre-eminent in the rulings of many American courts.
However, when looking at the question in terms of the protection of
the accused from the abuses of the prosecutor, secrecy seems detrimen-
tal in that the secrecy rules may allow the prosecutor to act with im-
punity before the grand jury. 2  The grand jury would not, therefore,
be able to perform its function of "standing between the accuser and
the accused."33  Affidavits and oral testimony of grand jurors are nor-
mally the only means available to a defendant to show that his indict-
28. United States v. Amazon Industrial Chemical Corp., 55 F.2d 254, 261 (D.
Mary., 1931); People v. Johnson, 31 Ill. 2d 602, 605, 203 N.E.2d 396, 400 (1964).
29. Note, Propriety of a Breach of Grand Jury Secrecy When No Indictment is
Returned, 7 HOUSTON L. REv. 341, 343 (1970).
30. All five secrecy reasons have been criticized as being irrelevant with respect
to post-dismissal secrecy. Calkins, The Fading Myth of Grand Jury Secrecy, 1 JOHN
MARSHALL J. 18 (1967).
31. See p. 309 supra.
32. The third secrecy goal contemplates subornation of Grand Jury witnesses by
accused parties. However, the imposition of strict secrecy after the dismissal of the
Grand Jury may conceal subornative acts of the prosecutor. If subornation by a prose-
cutor is contemplated by the third reason, as it should be, then post-dismissal secrecy
is an impediment to achieving the third goal.
33. See p. 308 supra.
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ment resulted from undue influence of the prosecutor over the grand
jurors rather than from evidence presented. 4 If the court refuses to
admit such testimony, the grand jury may be a "skirt" behind which a
malicious prosecutor can hide to prosecute unjustly an accused. 35  One
federal court had this to say on the matter:
If malicious, ambitious or over-zealous men, either in or out of
office, may with impunity persuade grand juries without any legal
evidence, either by hearsay testimony, undue influence, or worse
means, to indict whom they will, and there is no way in which the
courts may annul such illegal accusations, the grand jury, instead
of that protection of "the citizen against the unfounded accusa-
tion" . . . which it was primarily designed to provide, may be-
come an engine of oppression and a mockery of justice.3 6
Critics of the grand jury contend that even without bad-faith on the
part of the prosecutor, the grand jury has lost its independence because
of the dominance of the prosecutor. 37  Grand jurors are laymen who
lack legal expertise, and who are completely dependent on the prose-
cutor. The jurors may take part in the interrogation of witnesses, but
must rely on the prosecutor to initiate investigations, to tell them what
the charge is, and to select the witnesses and facts to be presented
(hearsay evidence is permissable). They must turn to the prosecutor
to discover the legal principles involved, to interpret the laws that apply
and to judge the weight of the evidence.3 3
Even if a grand jury were disposed to assert its historic inde-
pendence in the interest of an individual's liberty, it must, para-
doxically, look to the very person whose misconduct they are sup-
posed to guard against for guidance as to when he is acting op-
pressively. 39
34. In Illinois, the State's Attorney may instruct his reporter to attend the sessions
of the Grand Jury. If the State's Attorney does not provide for the reporter, the
court may, for good cause, appoint a reporter. "Only the grand jurors shall be present
during the deliberations and vote of the Grand Jury." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, sec.
112-6(a) (1969).
35. Kranitz, The Grand Jury, Past-Present-No Future, 24 Mo. L. REV. 318, 328
(1959). See, Grand Jury Indictment Procedure at 359.
36. Schmidt v. United States, 115 F.2d 394, 397 (6th Cir. 1940).
37. Supporters of the grand jury have challenged the accusation that the body is a
'rubberstamp' of the prosecutor on two grounds: "First . . . they explain that the
high incidence of agreement between the grand jury and the prosecutor indicates only
that the state is careful in its selection of cases. Second, they argue that the small
number of cases in which the grand jury disagrees are alone sufficient justification for
its existence." Note, Examination of the Grand Jury in New York, 2 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PROB. 88, 98 (1966).
38. Antell, The Modern Grand fury: Benighted Supergovernment, 51 A.B.A.J. 153,
154 (1965).
39. Id.
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Prosecutors' immunity from judicial review of their conduct would
serve to increase their dominance over the grand jury.
There are evident dangers to justice in either allowing or refusing
to allow grand jurors' testimony to impeach an indictment. Some
courts have decided the issue by balancing the dangers in light of the
facts presented, and some courts, like Illinois, have established a rule
to be applied in all cases.
ILLINOIS DECISIONS
The prosecutor in Illinois is allowed a great deal of independence be-
fore the grand jury, for Illinois courts have not favored the admission
of grand juror testimony for impeachment purposes. The landmark
ruling in this area is an 1893 case, Gitchell v. People,4 ° wherein the
court was called upon to decide whether grand jurors' affidavits were
admissable to show that twelve grand jurors did not consent to the
finding of the indictment. At that time the Illinois Criminal Code did
not expressly give the court discretion to order disclosure when justice
required it, as it does today. 4I The statute simply stated:
No grand juror, officer of the court, or other person shall disclose
that an indictment for felony is found, . . . nor shall any grandjuror state how any member of the jury voted or what opinion he
expressed on any question before them .... 42
The court held that an allowance of the affidavits would be tantamount
to disclosing how the jurors voted, which would directly contravene the
Code's prohibition. The Illinois statute provided that the grand jury
foreman's endorsement of a "true bill" on an indictment was evidence
that it was found by twelve jurors. The court would not admit the af-
fidavits to rebut this evidence. 43
The holding in this case is not directly on point with the situation in
Sears v. Romiti. The Gitchell court ruled that in light of the wording
of the Code, jurors may not disclose their votes; misconduct of the pros-
ecutor was not in question as there was nothing in the record indicating
any improper conduct on his part. Nevertheless, in dicta, the court
advised that the prosecutor may be present before the grand jury to
interrogate witnesses and give general instructions, but not to "influ-
ence or direct them in respect of their finding; nor ought he be present
when they are deliberating upon evidence, or when their vote is tak-
312
40. 146 Ill. 175, 33 N.E. 757 (1893).
41. See p. 315 infra.
42. 1 STARR & CUR. ANNO. ILL. STAT. ch. 38, sec. 595 (1893).
43. Gitchell v. People, 146 Ill. at 185, 33 N.E. at 760 (1893).
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en."' 44 The court did not indicate whether jurors' testimony could be
allowed to prove misconduct of a prosecutor. However, it noted with
approval the "general policy of the law" that "the proceedings of grand
juries shall be regarded as privileged communications, and that the
secrets of the grand jury room shall not be revealed."4 5 The court laid
down a general maxim of secrecy which served as precedent to many
Illinois cases that followed:
The hardship, which an accused party may suffer because he is
not allowed to go behind an indictment to see how it has been
found, will be small compared with the incalculable mischief which
will result to the public at large from a disclosure of what the law
deposits in the breast of a grand juror as an inviolable secret. An
innocent person will not be hurt by being forbidden to thus go be-
hind the indictment, "for he can always vindicate himself in a trial
upon the merits." '46
While the Gitchell court did not state that there are no circumstances
under which grand jurors' testimony should be heard, it clearly felt
that protection of the accused was adequately provided for at trial, and
was secondary to indictment secrecy in the facts of that case. "Incal-
culable mischief" here likely refers to the possibility of defendants mak-
ing improper overtures to grand jurors, in an attempt to cause quashing
of the indictment or a delay of trial. Such actions would cause vexa-
tion to grand jurors and increased expense and time for the adminis-
tration of justice.
In a 1909 decision, Kirsch v. Walter, an Illinois appellate court evi-
dently determined that the Gitchell decision did not strictly bar grand
jurors' testimony4 7 because it held that rules of grand jury secrecy
would not bar the introduction of evidence of the clerk and foreman of
the grand jury to show that the grand jury voted a true bill without
knowing that the defendant's name was included in it. The indictment
of the defendant was simply a mistake, and the court quashed the in-
dictment.
Another appellate court decision in 1910, People v. Strauch, allowed
grand jurors' affidavits for a limited use.4 8 The defendant therein al-
leged that the presiding judge improperly appeared before the grand
jury during its deliberations for the purpose of presenting a written
charge concerning the crime at hand. The court said that grand jurors'
44. Id. at 187, 33 N.E. at 760.
45. Id. at 183, 33 N.E. at 760.
46. Id. at 185, 33 N.E. at 760.
47. 151 Ill. App. 378 (1909).
48. 153 Il. App. 544, 549, affd, 247 Ill. 220, 93 N.E. 126 (1910).
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affidavits may not be received for the purpose of invalidating an in-
dictment, but may be used in support of one, and noted two affidavits
that showed the judge to be less culpable than the defendant claimed. 49
These appellate court decisions show that Gitchell cannot be read as
establishing an absolute rule against the admission of grand jurors'
testimony; nevertheless, no Illinois Supreme Court decision has allowed
such testimony. The Gitchell holding served as precedent for the 1910
case of People v. Arnold." The defendant therein charged that three
witnesses were present in the grand jury room at the same time, and
he produced affidavits of grand jurors to verify this occurrence. The
rule holds that witnesses must be alone during questioning in order to
preserve the secrecy of the proceedings. The defendant's motion to
quash the indictment was denied. The court saw no need to consider
the affidavits because other evidence was available to prove the de-
fendant's contentions, and it concluded that the occurrence could not
have prejudiced the defendant before the grand jury.51
Conduct of the prosecutor was called into question in the 1910 case
of People v. Nall,52 but on considerably different facts than in Sears v.
Romiti."3 The defendant attempted to question the grand jury fore-
man and special counsel for the state to prove that the special counsel
appeared before the grand jury during its deliberations, thereby taint-
ing the indictment with malice and corruption. The court, using Git-
chell as precedent, refused to allow the questioning, saying that it found
nothing in the record indicating improper conduct of the special coun-
sel.54
In a subsequent Illinois Supreme Court decision, a grand juror's af-
fidavit was offered to prove a lack of witness before the grand jury;55
other grand jurors gave affidavits to the contrary. The court cited the
Gitchell and Nall decisions and ruled that it would be improper to act
upon the affidavit of a grand juror seeking to impeach his indictment.
These Illinois Supreme Court decisions evidence a rather strong ad-
herence to secrecy of grand jury proceedings. However, in each case
the court noted that the improprieties charged were either unlikely to be
true, or not prejudicial to the accused, or both. This left open the pos-
49. 153 II1. App. at 549.
50. 248 Ill. 169, 93 N.E. 786 (1910).
51. Id. at 172, 93 N.E. at 787.
52. 242 Ill. 284, 89 N.E. 1012 (1909).
53. 50 Ill. 2d 51, 277 N.E.2d 705 (1971).
54. People v. Nail, 242 Il1. at 290, 89 N.E. at 1015.
55. People v. Miller, 264 Ill. 148, 152, 106 N.E. 191, 195 (1914).
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sibility that the court might hear grand jurors' testimony if a defendant
produced solid evidence of prejudicial misconduct of a prosecutor. In
a 1966 Illinois case, People v. Petruso, the defendant claimed that the
grand jury which indicted him was illegally drawn and therefore, the
indictment was defective.5 6 The Illinois Supreme Court concluded
that the trial court properly refused to quash the indictment "in the ab-
sence of any showing of improper influence, undue prejudice or other
matters which might have caused a true bill to be improperly re-
turned. . . . "' The court did not elaborate on how the undue in-
fluence or prejudice might be proved, but clearly entertained the pos-
sibility that an indictment would be quashed if the defendant pro-
duced sufficient evidence.
The court in Sears v. Romiti did not feel that its previous decisions
left open an opportunity to hear the testimony of grand jurors.5"
Rather, the court flatly stated that Illinois courts had established a strict
policy of secrecy whereby grand jurors may not be heard to impeach
their indictment. The Sears court did not say that the conduct of a
prosecutor was immune from attack by a defendant, but offered no
suggestions as to how misconduct might be shown. The majority opin-
ion echoed the Gitchell rationale by quoting Mr. Justice Black in
Costello v. United States:
If indictments were to be held open to challenge on the ground that
there was inadequate or incompetent evidence before the grand
jury, the resulting delay would be great indeed. The result of such
a rule would be that before trial on the merits a defendant could
always insist on a kind of preliminary trial to determine the com-
petency and adequacy of the evidence before the grand jury.59
In reaching its decision, the court construed Section 112-6(b) of the
Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure, which reads:
Matters occurring before the Grand Jury other than the delibera-
tions and vote of any grand juror may be disclosed when the court,
preliminary to or in connection with a judicial proceeding, directs
such in the interests of justice. 60
This section reflects the modem trend of expanding disclosure, as its
predecessor was more restrictive.61 It is clear that one purpose of 112-
56. 35 Ill. 2d 578, 221 N.E.2d 276 (1966).
57. Id. at 583, 221 N.E. at 279.
58. 50 Ill. 2d 51, 277 N.E.2d 705 (1971).
59. Costello v. United States, 390 U.S. 359, 363 (1956), cited in Sears v. Romiti
at 55, 277 N.E.2d at 707.
60. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, sec. 112-6 (1969).
61. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, sec. 112-6 (1963), as amended ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
sec. 112-6 (1969). As originally enacted, sec. 112-6(b) provided:
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6(b) was to give the court discretion to provide the defendant with
transcripts of relevant testimony given to the grand jury, so that he
could better prepare for trial. After the enactment of 112-6(b), the
Illinois Supreme Court issued Rule 412 which eliminates the court's
discretion and gives a defendant the right to mandatory disclosure of
relevant testimony. 62  The court in Sears was not as expansive in re-
gard to grand jurors' impeachment, saying that previous decisions did
not sanction the hearing of jurors' testimony and that "section 112-6(b)
does not authorize the kind of hearing proposed to be conducted by the
trial court."63
The Committee Comments to'section 112-6(b) lend support to the
court's interpretation, stating that " . . inquiry into the finding of the
indictment is prevented in order to preserve the secrecy of the proceed-
ings. The defendant has his chance at trial (Gitchell v. People)."'64
Thus, the rule in Illinois which prohibits jurors from being heard to
impeach their indictment was crystallized by statutory interpretation.
The dissenting opinion in Sears v. Romiti 5 considered section 112-6
(b) analogous to Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure, which states in part that occurrences before the grand jury may
be disclosed, upon direction of the court, " . . . at the request of the
defendant upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dis-
miss the indictment because of matters occurring before the grand ju-
ry.",66  A comparable provision is not found in section 112-6(b), but
the dissenting Justices contend that a basic rule of construction in Illi-
nois is that " . . . exceptions other than those designated by statute
cannot be read into [a statute]. ' 67  Therefore, the clause in section
112-6(b) reading "in the interests of justice" could encompass the au-
thorization of jurors' affidavits for impeachment purposes "in the in-
terests of justice." Although this interpretation of the statute did not
prevail, many federal court decisions were cited in both opinions to
When the State uses, for the purpose of examining any witness, any part of
a transcript of matters occurring before the Grand Jury, that portion of the
transcript may be disclosed when the court, preliminary to or in connection
with a judicial proceeding, directs such in the interests of justice.
This statute gave the court power to disclose testimony to the defendant only when
the state first used the testimony. Grand Jury minutes not used by the state could not
be revealed to the defendant. See, Calkins and Wiley, Grand Jury Secrecy Under the
Illinois Criminal Code-Unconstitutional, 59 Nw. L. REv. 577 (1964).
62. Ill. Sup. Ct. Rule 412(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. llOa, sec. 412 (1969).
63. People ex rel Sears v. Romiti, 50 I1U.2d 51, 277 N.E.2d 705 (1971).
64. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, sec. 112-6 (1969).
65. 50 111. 2d 51, 277 N.E.2d 705 (1971).
66. FED. R. CRIM. PR. 6(e).
67. People ex rel Sears v. Romiti, 50 Ill. 2d 51, 277 N.E.2d 705 (1971).
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support the view that impeachment should be allowed in some circum-
stances. These decisions are worthy of note.
FEDERAL DECISIONS
The question of grand juror impeachment has not yet raised any
constitutional issues in the federal courts. The right of an accused to
an unbiased grand jury under the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment may be crystallizing, but there are no direct holdings on this
point."" Thus, federal courts, like state courts, have decided the ques-
tion with a blend of common law and public policy considerations.
In raising infirmities concerning the proceedings of a federal grand
jury, the defendant must overcome a strong legal presumption that the
indictment is valid. 9 Federal courts have been very cautious in quash-
ing indictments for alleged misconduct of the prosecutor 7° and, there-
fore, one treatise on federal procedure concludes that the conduct of
the prosecutor in obtaining the indictment is "virtually unreviewable"
by the court.71
Federal courts' predilection favoring validity of the indictment is
shown by a portion of the opinion in United States v. Mitchell:
The district attorney may explain both his case and his law to the
jury. . . . If he went beyond this, his acts may constitute an ir-
regularity, but the case must be extreme before the court will try
the district attorney or the grand jury . . . in order to determine
whether it will try a defendant. 72
This view was upheld in the case of United States v. A.M.A., 7" wherein
the defendant made a motion to investigate proceedings of the grand
jury, including examination of the jurors, to discover possible defects
upon which the validity of the indictment could be attacked. The
court refused to grant the motion, saying: "Considerations of public
68. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956): "An indictment re-
turned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury, like an information drawn by
the prosecutor, if valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the charge on the
merits." Mr. Justice Burton concurred, but cautioned: ". . . I agree with Judge
Learned Hand that 'if it appeared that no evidence had been offered that ration-
ally established the facts, the indictment ought to be quashed; because then the
grand jury would have in substance abdicated." Id. at 363. The term "unbiased"
as used by the majority likely refers to the systematic exclusion of Negroes from the
grand jury rolls. See, Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939); Beck v. Washington,
369 U.S. 541 (1962); and, Bartlett, Defendant's Right to an Unbiased Federal
Grand Jury, 47 BOSTON U.L.R. 551 (1967).
69. Beatrice Foods Co. v. United States, 312 F.2d 29, 39 (8th Cir. 1963).
70. Id.
71. 8 MOORP, FEDERAL PRACTICE, sec. 6.04 at 6-22 (1968).
72. 136 F. 896 (C.C.D. Ore. 1905).
73. 26 F. Supp. 429 (D.D.C. 1939).
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policy demand a lasting secrecy. Jurors are thereby inspired with as-
surance of security in discharging their important duties and restrained
from impeaching their findings. '74
Despite judicial caution, federal courts have quashed indictments
when it was shown that the conduct of the district attorney before the
grand jury was clearly prejudicial to the defendant. 75  And the courts
have, at times, allowed jurors' affidavits to prove prejudicial irregulari-
ties in the proceedings. In an 1881 case, United States v. Farrington,
the court acknowledged the absolute supremacy of secrecy in many
states, but decided that grand jurors' affidavits should be allowed in
cases of extreme irregularity.76 This court allowed affidavits docu-
menting the presence and conduct of unauthorized persons before the
grand jury. The Farrington court's reason for its holding is interesting
in that it focuses solely on the protection of the accused:
It is the duty of the court, in the control of its grand jury proceed-
ings, to see to it that no person shall be subjected to the expense,
vexation, and contumely of a trial for a criminal offense unless the
charge has been investigated and a reasonable foundation shown
for an indictment. . . . It is only practicable to do this by re-
moving the veil of secrecy whenever evidence of what has tran-
spired before [the grand jury] becomes necessary to protect pub-
lic or private rights.77
In a 1908 decision, United States v. Wells, the defendant moved to
quash the indictment because of alleged misconduct of the prosecutor. 71
The district attorney had appeared before the grand jury and reviewed
and discussed the evidence given to that body, had applied the law
thereto and expressed his opinion that the accused was guilty, and had
urged the return of an indictment. The defendant offered jurors' af-
fidavits to prove the misconduct and the court allowed them. The
grand jurors testified that they were not influenced by the prosecutor's
statements, and the court determined that there was sufficient proof to
justify the return of an indictment. Nevertheless, the court quashed the
indictment on the basis that an accused has a constitutional right to be
indicted only by the judgment of a properly conducted grand jury.
If a reviewing court decides that a grand jury was conducted improp-
erly and proceeds to judge the sufficiency of the evidence itself, it is
74. Id. at 430.
75. United States v. Wells, 163 F. 313 (D. Idaho 1908); United States v. DiGrazia,
213 F. Supp. 232 (N.D. I11. 1963).
76. United States v. Farrington, 5 F. 343 (N.D.N.Y. 1881).
77. Id. at 345.
78. 163 F. 313 (D. Idaho 1908).
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substituting its judgment for that of a fair grand jury and denying the
accused his constitutional right. 79  This compelling rationale is con-
veniently overlooked by many courts.
The Wells decision was characterized as "extraordinary" in a 1967
ruling, United States v. Bruzgo, 0 wherein the appellate court upheld
the trial court's refusal to allow the defendant to take affidavits of
grand jurors to show improper statements allegedly made by the prose-
cutor in front of the grand jury. The appellate court would not allow
the affidavits because it found that even if the alleged statements of
the prosecutor were proved, there was still sufficient evidence to justify
the indictment.8' This decision seems to ignore the caveat given by
the Wells court concerning the injustice caused when a reviewing court
usurps the function of a properly conducted grand jury. However,
this decision is in line with the general rule in federal courts that mis-
conduct must be clearly prejudicial before " . . . the court will try the
district attorney or the grand jury . . . in order to determine whether
it will try a defendant. '8 2  The courts often balance the gravity of the
prejudice to the integrity of the grand jury against the policy of secrecy
and the concomitant presumption of indictment validity. The Bruzgo
court distinguished the facts in the Wells decision, saying that the dis-
trict attorney therein virtually coerced the jury into returning an indict-
ment, and it concluded:
Insofar as [the Wells decision] recognizes that there can be situ-
ations where the propriety of the action of a prosecutor may be so
extreme as to require a court to vitiate an indictment on that
ground, we have no occasion here to quarrel with the case.8 3
In a recent decision, United States v. DiGrazia, the District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois quashed an indictment because of mis-
conduct of the prosecutor. 84  The defendant testified before a grand
jury without having been told of his constitutional rights to remain
silent and consult with counsel, and without being informed that his
statements could be used against him. No grand juror's affidavits or
testimony were offered, and the court found no evidence that the de-
79. Id. at 327.
80. 373 F.2d 383 (3rd Cir. 1967). The facts of the Wells case were also dis-
tinguished in United States v. Rintelen, 235 F. 787, 794 (S.D.N.Y. 1916), wherein
the court said: "A plea based on the conduct of the district attorney before the
grand jury should be adjudged insufficient unless it clearly shows prejudice to the de-
fendant and indicates that the alleged irregularities affected the action of the grandjury."
81. United States v. Bruzgo, 373 F.2d at 386 (3rd Cir. 1967).
82. United States v. Mitchell, 136 F. 896 (C.C.D. Ore. 1905).
83. United States v. Bruzgo, 373 F.2d at 387 (3rd Cir. 1967).
84. 213 F. Supp. 232 (N.D. 111. 1963).
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fendant made any incriminating statements. Nevertheless, the court
said it could not be sure that the defendant did not tend to incriminate
himself by his appearance, and that this doubt, standing alone, is suf-
ficient to quash an indictment when constitutional rights are involved.
In concluding its opinion, the court said that the express purpose of the
grand jury is to insure that people will not be accused of crimes be-
cause of the zeal or malice of the prosecutor, and therefore:
It is the duty of a prosecutor presenting a case to a grand jury not
to inflame or otherwise improperly influence the jurors against any
person. Even the presence of the prosecutor while the jurors are
deliberating their action, though he say nothing, may be grounds
for quashing the indictment.85
Although no decision has specifically held that Rule 6(e) (permit-
ting disclosure if grounds may exist for quashing an indictment) au-
thorizes grand juror impeachment of an indictment, the cases would
support this interpretation. Federal courts are hesitant to encroach
upon grand jury secrecy, but have continued to view the grand jury
as a means of protecting the accused from the prosecutor. Therefore,
in extreme cases of misconduct on the part of the prosecutor, federal
courts will quash an indictment. And they have, when warranted, al-
lowed grand jurors' testimony to show such misconduct.
STATE DECISIONS
A general, though not universal, rule throughout the states is that
testimony of grand jurors is not admissible to impeach an indictment
which they returned. 6 In Hall v. State,87 an Alabama case, the de-
fendant moved to quash his indictment, alleging that the prosecutor
and presiding judge repeatedly urged the grand jury to return an indict-
ment. The court held that grand jurors' testimony was inadmissible
to prove the charge, saying that allowance of the testimony
[would] be destructive and subversive of the grand jury as an
institution of our judicial system, and destructive of that security of
freedom of thought and action, and therefore of that independence
so absolutely essential to the faithful discharge of the duties im-
posed upon that body, which if impaired or destroyed would be
fatal to a vigorous administration of the criminal law.8 s
This line of reasoning has been followed by some other states, there-
by imposing a strict policy of secrecy that may not be breached to show
85. Id. at 235, citing United States v. Wells, 163 F. 313 (D. Idaho 1908).
86. Annot., 110 A.L.R. 1025 (1937).
87. 134 Ala. 90, 32 So. 750 (1902).
88. Id. at 113.
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improper proceedings, even if they may have resulted in prejudice to
the defendant.89 The courts often justify this reasoning by pointing
out that an indicted defendant has an opportunity to exculpate him-
self at trial; if he is acquitted little harm is done, and if he is found guilty
justice has prevailed. Establishing new procedural safeguards for an
accused before a grand jury would, at best, unnecessarily complicate
the function of a trial, and at worst, turn the grand jury into a costly
and time consuming preliminary hearing. Some jurisdictions have em-
braced a policy of lowering the secrecy barrier when, in the court's dis-
cretion, the facts warrant it. This policy has engendered problems in
evaluating the credibility of the grand jurors' testimony which the
courts must resolve on a case-by-case basis.
Pennsylvania courts followed a rather strict policy of grand juror
secrecy, but in a well-reasoned opinion, Commonwealth v. Smart,9"
that state's superior court modified its position. The defendant therein
asked the court to investigate improper and prejudicial actions of the
prosecutor before the grand jury; however, the defendant's only sup-
port for his allegation was his own testimony that an anonymous grand
juror had revealed such improper actions to him. The court said:
Even though it might be possible to imagine a situation which pre-
sented justification, and even necessity, to investigate the acts and
conduct of a prosecuting officer during the course of his attend-
ance upon the Grand Jury, it is certainly true that such an investi-
gation should never, under any circumstances, be instituted except
on the basis of credible, detailed, sworn and persuasive averments
by witnesses of the irregularities complained of.91
The defendant's motion did little more than ask for a fishing expedi-
tion, so the motion was denied. Had the defendant substantiated his
charge with sworn affidavits of grand jurors, a hearing would have fol-
lowed.
Other state courts have allowed jurors' testimony in a variety of cir-
cumstances. The Supreme Court of Iowa received the affidavits of
grand jurors to prove that a supervising judge entered a grand jury
room and personally urged the indictment of a defendant.92 In Mas-
sachusetts, a court heard testimony of grand jurors regarding undue
influence exercised by the prosecutor over the grand jury. The court
89. United States v. Tallmadge, 14 N.M. 293, 91 P. 729 (1907); Lewis v. State,
132 Miss. 200, 96 So. 169 (1923); People v. Nail, 242 Ill. 284, 89 N.E. 1012 (1909);
Annot., 110 A.L.R. 1025 (1937).
90. 368 Pa. 630, 84 A.2d 782 (1951).
91. Id. at 636, 84 A.2d at 786.
92. State v. Will, 97 Iowa 58, 173 So. 169 (1937).
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said that " . . . justice may be outraged or go unsatisfied unless such
conduct before the grand jury can be disclosed."9  The Louisiana
Supreme Court held that grand jurors could testify that a prosecutor
was present during their deliberations, stating that it was unable to
conceive of how such presence could be proved other than by such
testimony.94
In a New Jersey case, State v. Manney,95 the court had no quarrel
with the allowance of grand jurors' affidavits to show the presence of
an unauthorized person in the grand jury room during voting and
deliberations, but was quite concerned with the competency of the af-
fidavits. The court said the affidavits contained only conclusions, not
facts. Furthermore, as the affidavits were obtained eight months after
the indictment, the court questioned the jurors' recall of the incident.
However, rather than ruling the evidence too weak to contest the valid-
ity of the indictment, the court ordered a full hearing into the matter.
Holding that such vital questions should not be determined on affi-
davits alone, the court stated that: "The public interest requires a full
inquiry.
9 6
The court in Sears v. Romit? 7 considered these state decisions allow-
ing impeachment. The majority labeled the decisions "scattered and
sporadic" and declined to deviate from a policy of strict secrecy.
It is apparent that when an Illinois court refuses to hear grand jurors'
testimony that the prosecutor procured an indictment in bad faith, the
protection of citizens from abusive prosecution is diminished. How-
ever, indictment by an Illinois grand jury does not result in the puni-
tive consequences that an old English indictment did. Whereas in
England the indictment raised presumptions of guilt that were often
difficult to rebut, the indicted defendant in Illinois is presumed inno-
cent of the crime charged and is given a trial in which his constitu-
tional rights are vigorously protected.98 The oppression that drove the
English to use the grand jury as a bulwark against the abuses of the
prosecutor vanished with the development of the American trial sys-
tem. Justice Field once stated:
In this country, from the popular character of our institutions,
there has seldom been any contest between the government and
93. Attorney General v. Pelletier, 240 Mass. 264, 134 N.E. 407 (1922).
94. State v. Kifer, 186 La. 674, 173 So. 169 (1937).
95. 24 N.J. 571, 133 A.2d 313 (1957).
96. Id. at 577, 133 A.2d at 316.
97. 50 111. 2d 51, 277 N.E.2d 705 (1971).
98. Grand Jury Indictment Procedure at 349.
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the citizens, which required the existence of the grand jury as a
protection against oppressive action of the government.99
In addition, as the apprehension and prosecution of criminals becomes
increasingly prolonged and complex, courts are placing emphasis on
assuring the ability of the grand jury to function as an efficient method
of bringing suspects to trial. To promote its efficiency the court must
prevent a defendant from using the grand jury as an evasive mechan-
ism. If investigations into the conduct of prosecutors were allowed,
mischievous defendants would seize the opportunity to initiate dilatory
tactics and divert the course of the proceedings from themselves to
attacks upon the prosecutors. Judge Learned Hand once said,
No doubt grand juries err and indictments are calamities to honest
men, but we must work with human beings and we can correct
such errors only at too large a price . ... To grant [a defend-
ant's motion to investigate proceedings before the grand jury]
would do violence to salutary rules strongly rooted in our juris-
prudence which, without sacrificing any of the fundamental safe-
guards, look to the speedy and practical administration of criminal
justice. . . .100
Judge Hand's argument is impressive, but regardless of the protec-
tion afforded an individual at a trial, and regardless of the need for
speedy administration of justice, it is still a very serious thing for a man
to be indicted for a crime. One federal court pointed out that whether
the accused is innocent or guilty he cannot escape " . . . the ignominy
of the accusation, the dangers of perjury and error at his trial, the
torture of suspense and the pains of imprisonment or the burden of
bail."'' 1  The Illinois Supreme Court recognized these dangers in Peo-
ple v. Sears, stating:
Nor do we find persuasive the argument that a defendant wrong-
fully indicted has his day in court at trial, and assuming vindica-
tion by acquittal has not been harmed thereby. We agree ...
that a wrongful indictment inflicts substantial harm on a defendant
not entirely remedied by acquittal. 10 2
It is curious that the court, in its subsequent decision of Sears v. Romiti,
ignored that statement and embraced a policy of secrecy, commonly
justified by disparaging the importance of an indictment and extolling
the remedial qualities of a trial.
The smear of a reputation may be the most obnoxious result of an
indictment, especially to a public figure such as a state's attorney.
99. Charge to the Grand Jury, 30 F. Cas. 992 (No. 18,255) (C.C.D. Cal. 1872).
100. United States v. Garrison, 291 F. 646, 649 (D.S.D.N.Y. 1923).
101. Schmidt v. United States, 115 F.2d 394, 397 (6th Cir. 1940).
102. People v. Sears, 49 Ill. 2d 14, 37, 273 N.E.2d 380, 392 (1971).
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Americans have been characterized as possessing a strong tendency to
equate accusation with guilt: "Where there's smoke, there's fire. ' 03
In this respect an indictment can be much more damaging than an ac-
cusation by information °4 because of the tremendous publicity that at-
taches to grand jury indictment procedures. 05 Conversely, the grand
jury protects the prosecutor from adverse publicity. The grand jury
can shield a bad faith prosecutor from the adverse public opinion
which would otherwise result if the prosecutor sought to press charges
by an information without a semblance of probable cause.' 01 The
chief criticism of the grand jury system is that proof of probable cause
prior to trial is not insured because the prosecutor has so much control
over the proceedings. Accordingly, it has been suggested that pre-
liminary hearings should replace grand juries because they afford great-
er protection for the accused and entail a speedier and less expensive
procedure. At a preliminary hearing, the prosecutor must justify his
information by establishing probable cause to a magistrate. A preda-
tory prosecutor is not likely to be held in check by a body of confused
laymen that comprise a grand jury but he can be checked by the court
at a preliminary hearing. 0
In view of the fifth amendment, it is improbable that the grand jury
will fall into disuse in the federal system, at least with respect to its
accusatory function. Use of the grand jury by the states is not dictated
by the fifth amendment, and use of the information is increasing
throughout state jurisprudence. A 1964 survey showed that 18 states
have abolished the necessity of the grand jury in all cases; all criminal
accusations can be made by information. Two other states have re-
stricted the use of the grand jury to cases of capital crimes only. Most
103. Note, Propriety o1 a Breach of Grand Jury Secrecy When No Indictment is
Returned, 7 HOUSTON L. REV. 341 (1970).
104. " 'Information' means a verified written statement signed by a State's Attor-
ney, and presented to a court, which charges the commission of an offense." ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, sec. 102-1 (1969). An information differs from an indictment
only in that it is presented by a prosecutor instead of a grand jury.
105. The indicted defendants in People ex rel Sears v. Romiti (50 Ill. 2d 51,
277 N.E.2d 705 (1971)) also contended that their indictment should be dismissed be-
cause of extensive adverse publicity. The court ruled against this charge because it is
impossible to transfer an indictment proceeding to another county, as is done with
trials. The only remedy would be to dismiss the indictment and "[t]o permit such
an attack upon an indictment would tend to immunize persons involved in events
upon which the news media concentrated their attention." In this regard, California
law sanctions both public and private grand jury sessions. If the court decides that
sufficient public interest exists, as in the case of corruption of public officials, the
court will order public sessions to achieve exposure. Cal. Penal Code, sec. 925 (1937).
See, Note; Federal Grand Jury Secrecy, 5 GONZAGA L. REv. 255, 259 (1970).
106. Grand Jury Indictment Procedure at 359.
107. Antell, The Modern Grand Jury: Benighted Supergovernment, 51 A.B.A.J.
153, 156 (1965).
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of the remaining states have restricted the use of the grand jury to cases
of felonies, "serious crimes", or "public offenses."1 8  The movement
against use of the grand jury by states would be curtailed if the United
States Supreme Court rules that all rights guaranteed by the first ten
amendments to the Federal Constitution are binding on the states by
means of the fourteenth amendment. However, this possibility is re-
mote; the proposition has never commanded a majority of the Court.'
The 1870 Illinois Constitution provided for grand jury indictment
in felony cases, but gave the legislature the authority to abolish it by
law." The Illinois State and Chicago Bar Associations' Joint Com-
mittee to Revise the Illinois Criminal Code supported inclusion of the
grand jury in the 1963 Illinois Criminal Code of Criminal Procedure,
and the legislature concurred."1 ' The 1970 Illinois Constitution con-
tinues the provision of grand jury indictment in felony cases, but au-
thorizes the General Assembly to limit as well as abolish use of the
system. 1 2 Thus, it is conceivable that the General Assembly will cur-
tail the -use of the grand jury. In this respect, it must be noted that
most Illinois grand jury proceedings follow a preliminary hearing.
Therefore, the grand jury merely duplicates the efforts of the magis-
trate who found probable cause."' If, in fact, the preliminary hear-
ing is the superior mechanism for safeguarding the rights of the ac-
cused, the grand jury is expensive surplusage in Illinois. It may be
contended that grand juries are especially useful in bringing malfeasant
public officials to trial; that is, that a body of laymen will more readily
accuse a public official than would a magistrate who is sensitive to
political or peer pressure. Today this argument is largely illusory be-
cause the grand jury is an arm of the court and depends on that court
for its power and direction."'
The court's decision in Sears v. Romiti warrants concern over the
grand jury's viability as an instrument of justice for an accused in Illi-
nois." ' The decision sets forth a practicable rule under which pre-
siding courts must operate; grand jurors may not impeach their indict-
ment. This rule will conveniently expedite the administration of jus-
108. Note, The Grand Jury, Past and Present: A Survey, 2 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 119,
126-142 (1953).
109. See, the dissent of Mr. Justice Black, Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,
68 (1947).
110. ILL. CONST. art. II, sec. 8 (1970).
111. Note, Survey of the Grand Jury System, 3 PORTIA L.J. 70 (1967).
112. ILL. CONST. art. I, sec. 7 (1970).
113. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, sec. 109 (1969).
114. People v. Sears, 49 I11. 2d 14, 273 N.E.2d 380 (1971).
115. 50 111. 2d 51, 277 N.E.2d 705 (1971).
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tice in Illinois and will be harmless in most cases because the indict-
ment is normally just a pro forma requirement. However, the grand
jury's finding is extremely important in some cases, such as those in-
volving public officials, and the rule sacrifices a little more of the pro-
tection that the grand jury once offered an accused. The court's de-
cision in Sears gives strength to the contention that the grand jury no
longer stands between a prosecutor and an accused. In view of the
divergent holdings throughout this country on the question of grand
juror impeachment, and the formidable arguments supporting every
holding, it would be futile to attempt to decide whether the Sears
court's decision is a proper solution. There are simply too many irrec-
oncilable policy considerations. But the decision does call into
question the value of the grand jury in Illinois jurisprudence. The
legislature should re-examine the grand jury in Illinois, and determine
what function it should serve in the administration of justice. If it can
fulfill its function only at the expense of protection of an accused, or at
great expense of the court's time and the citizens' money, an alternative
should be found.
MICHAEL K. WILLIAMS
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